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The empirical analysis of the paper suggests that an FX policy objective and concerns 
about an overheating of the domestic economy have been the two main motives for 
the (re-)introduction and persistence of capital controls over the past decade. Capital 
controls are strongly associated with countries having significantly undervalued 
exchange rates. Capital controls also appear to be less motivated by worries about 
financial market volatility or fickle capital flows per se, but rather by concerns about 
capital inflows triggering an overheating of the economy – in the form of high credit 
growth, rising inflation and output volatility. Moreover, countries with a high level of 
capital controls, and those actively implementing controls, tend to be those that have 
fixed exchange rate regimes, a non-IT monetary policy regime and shallow financial 
markets. This evidence is consistent with capital controls being used, at least in part, 
to compensate for the absence of autonomous macroeconomic and prudential policies 
and effective adjustment mechanisms for dealing with capital flows.  
 
JEL No.: F30; F31. 
Keywords: capital controls, capital flows, exchange rates, financial stability, 
economic policy, G20. 
 
  1Non-technical summary 
 
The question whether capital controls should be part of the tool box of policy-makers 
to deal with capital flows has become one of the central issues in the international 
economic policy debate. It has been one of the key policy issues in the G20 under the 
French Presidency in 2011, and has been covered extensively by the IMF and other 
international institutions and fora. However, despite a G20 commitment to arrive at 
“coherent conclusions” on capital flow management, only limited progress has been 
made so far.  
 
One reason for the slow progress is that there are few policy issues that have been as 
controversial as the one on the desirability of capital controls. One side of the debate 
argues that financial liberalization and integration are a key foundation for global 
prosperity and growth, with capital mobility and access to foreign capital being an 
important source for investment and the diversification of risk. On the other hand, in 
particular policy-makers of some emerging market economies (EMEs) have been 
emphasizing the risks stemming from unfettered capital flows for the macroeconomic 
and financial stability objectives of their countries. 
 
Looking at all these arguments in favor and against capital controls, four overarching 
motives for the use of capital controls have emerged in the recent policy debate: an 
FX policy objective; a capital flow management goal; a financial stability aim; and a 
macroeconomic policy objective. The purpose of the present paper is to test the 
empirical validity of these four hypotheses. Which of these four objectives is the 
primary motive for capital controls? The paper uses a broad set of macroeconomic 
and financial variables to gauge, for a broad set of 79 economies over the period 
1984-2009, which of the four hypotheses are most important. 
 
Overall, the findings of the paper suggest that an FX policy objective and concerns 
about an overheating of the domestic economy have been the two main motives for 
policies of capital flow management over the past two decades, and in particular in 
the 2000s. Capital controls – both the level and the likelihood of raising existing 
controls further – are strongly associated with countries with fixed exchange rate 
regimes and significantly undervalued exchange rates. As to the financial stability 
side, the evidence suggests that capital controls are less motivated by worries about 
financial market volatility, but rather by concerns about capital inflows triggering or 
contributing to an overheating of the economy – in the form of high credit growth, 
rising inflation and output volatility. 
 
These findings have a number of policy implications. A first important point is that 
capital control measures seem to be used not in a purely defensive manner when it 
comes to FX policy – the presence and introduction of capital controls are not merely 
associated with avoiding an appreciation or overvaluation of the domestic currency, 
but rather are linked to a significant undervaluation of the exchange rate. This 
suggests that the concerns by policy-makers about “competitive devaluations” and 
“currency wars”, which have become so prominent in recent years, may not be 
unfounded.  
 
As a second point, the evidence is consistent with the argument that capital flow 
management (CFM) policies are used to compensate for the absence of autonomous 
  2macroeconomic and financial policies and effective adjustment mechanisms. The fact 
that countries with a high level of capital controls, and those actively implementing 
controls, tend to be those that have fixed exchange rate regimes, have a non-IT 
monetary policy regime, and have shallow financial markets indicates that policy-
makers use capital controls to try and protect their economies against capital flows. 
Although the size of the capital flows is rather modest relative to the overall size of 
the economy in countries with higher capital controls, their effect on the domestic 
economy (credit growth, inflation and output volatility) tends to be large when other 
policy tools than capital controls, and deep financial markets to absorb those flows, 
are absent. 
 
The fact that countries with high capital controls exhibit a worse performance with 
regard to credit growth, inflation and output volatility – and introducing (additional) 
controls does not seem to lower these overheating pressures systematically in 
subsequent years – makes it very hard to see capital control measures as a first-best 
policy option. Instead, financial market development and the creation of policy 
frameworks allowing for autonomous and credible macroeconomic and prudential 
policies may constitute a superior path to shield the domestic economy from fickle 
capital flows. Of course, capital flow management policies are seen by some as 
temporary measures to “buy time” for policy-makers to enact more fundamental 
macroeconomic and prudential reforms. Yet a risk is that such policies not only create 
domestic and international distortions, but reduce incentives for policy makers to 
pursue such deeper reforms. The persistence or frequent re-introduction of capital 
control measures suggest that this risk may not be unfounded. 
  3I. Introduction 
 
The question whether capital controls should be part of the tool box of policy-makers 
to deal with capital flows has become one of the central issues in the international 
economic policy debate. It has been one of the key policy issues in the G20 under the 
French Presidency in 2011, and has been covered extensively by the IMF and other 
international institutions and fora. However, despite a G20 commitment to arrive at 
“coherent conclusions” on capital flow management, only limited progress has been 
made so far.  
 
One reason for the slow progress is that there are few policy issues that have been as 
controversial as the one on the desirability of capital controls. One side of the debate 
argues that financial liberalization and integration are a key foundation for global 
prosperity and growth, with capital mobility and access to foreign capital being an 
important source for investment and the diversification of risk. On the other hand, in 
particular policy-makers of some emerging market economies (EMEs) have been 
emphasizing the risks stemming from unfettered capital flows for the macroeconomic 
and financial stability objectives of their countries. 
 
Looking at all these arguments in favor and against capital controls, four overarching 
motives for the use of capital controls have emerged in the recent policy debate: an 
FX policy objective; a capital flow management goal; a financial stability aim; and a 
macroeconomic policy objective. First, authorities may pursue capital controls with an 
FX policy objective in mind, i.e. to maintain a stable exchange rate that is not 
overvalued, and thus does not impinge on the competitiveness of the domestic 
economy. Critics of capital controls and those pointing at the presence of 
“competitive devaluations” have gone even a step further and argued that capital 
controls have in some cases been actively used to achieve or maintain undervalued 
exchange rates. 
 
Second, policy-makers goal with the pursuit of capital controls may be related to 
capital flows, i.e. to reduce both the volume and volatility of capital flows, and to 
lower the share of relatively more risky portfolio flows. A third objective discussed in 
the policy debate is that of financial stability: policy-makers may maintain or 
implement capital controls in order to shield the domestic economy and financial 
institutions from volatile capital flows and avoid an overheating and over-reliance on 
foreign capital. Under the fourth, real economy objective, capital controls of countries 
may reflect concerns about the real economy (growth, growth volatility, inflation or 
public debt) or external vulnerability (current account, external debt). 
 
The purpose of the present paper is to test the empirical validity of these four 
hypotheses. Which of these four objectives is the primary motive for capital controls? 
The paper starts by identifying the characteristics of countries with high levels of 
capital controls and what makes these countries different from those with free capital 
mobility. The paper uses a broad set of macroeconomic and financial variables to 
gauge, for a broad set of 79 economies over the period 1984-2009, which of the four 
hypotheses are most important for understanding which countries maintain a high 
level of financial restrictions and which have few restrictions. 
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policy-makers to actively change the level of capital controls. Which of the four 
hypotheses explains best why some policy-makers impose or raise capital controls, 
and which why others reduce them? 
 
The third element of the analysis is based on an event study which investigates the 
evolution of macroeconomic and financial variables around changes – increases as 
well as reductions – in capital controls. How are countries raising controls different 
from those that lower them or keep them unchanged? And what is the experience of 
countries in the years after changing capital controls relative to others? 
 
Addressing these questions is challenging, partly because of the complexity of the 
various factors that may induce policy actions, and partly due to methodological 
difficulties in identifying causes and effects. The paper takes a different approach 
from much of the literature which focuses on the effects or effectiveness of capital 
controls. The main goal of the present paper is not to analyze the effects of controls, 
but to identify which motives induce policy makers to adopt them in the first place; 
irrespective of whether or not they are then successful in achieving their objectives. 
This more modest objective allows also averting some of the difficult issues related to 
identification and in particular to endogeneity of the introduction of capital controls; a 
more detailed discussion follows below. The capital control measures employed are 
those developed by Chinn and Ito (2011) as well as Schindler (2009), which are 
proxies for the de jure financial openness of countries. 
 
Overall, the empirical findings of the paper suggest that an FX policy objective has 
been an important if not dominant motive of capital controls globally. Countries with 
higher levels of capital controls tend to have undervalued (real effective) exchange 
rates. The undervaluation of the exchange rate is the single most important variable 
explaining a larger share of the difference in the level of capital controls across 
countries than any other variable in the analysis. Moreover, countries with 
undervalued exchange rates are more likely to raise existing capital controls further, 
especially since 1999. The event study analysis suggests that the degree of 
undervaluation increases in the years following large rises in capital controls. In 
addition, countries with high exchange rate volatility do not only tend to have 
significantly higher levels of capital controls but are also more likely to raise controls. 
 
Yet there is another important dimension to the link of capital controls and FX policy, 
which relates to the exchange rate regime and the monetary policy regime of a 
country. Reducing the volatility and magnitude of capital flows through 
administrative controls makes it considerably easier for a central bank to maintain a 
fixed exchange rate regime. Conversely, countries having a flexible currency regime 
and an inflation-targeting monetary policy regime are less likely to need capital 
controls to achieve their policy objectives. The findings of the empirical analysis are 
consistent with this argument, as countries with flexible exchange rate regimes and 
those with an inflation targeting (IT) regime tend to be more open financially. 
Moreover, since 1999 countries with inflation targeting regimes have much more 
frequently reduced existing capital controls than non-IT countries. 
 
By contrast, there is no compelling evidence in the data that either the level of or 
changes in capital flows per se are an important motive for capital controls: countries 
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economies – are those that have more open capital accounts. Moreover, countries that 
have raised capital controls in the past have tended to be countries with a 
comparatively lower level and volatility of capital flows. This evidence is 
corroborated by the event study, which shows that in particular net portfolio flows 
decline in the years following significant increases in capital controls. 
 
The evidence also uncovers only a mixed link between financial stability objectives 
and the level and changes in capital controls. Countries with deeper financial markets 
are those with a lower level of capital controls and are also less likely to raise capital 
controls. Moreover, countries with more financial stress (in bond, equity and money 
markets) in prior years tend to have lower levels of controls and are more likely to 
liberalize their capital account in subsequent years. 
 
By contrast, in particular countries with high growth rates in the credit to the private 
sector are significantly more likely to raise capital controls. This variable on credit 
growth turns out to be one of three most important variables accounting for cross-
country differences in capital controls. Moreover, also countries with high inflation 
and high volatility in GDP growth are more likely to raise capital controls. Taken 
together, this suggests that concerns about an overheating of the economy, rather than 
purely financial market or asset price concerns, guide the decisions of policy-makers 
to raise capital controls. 
 
Many of these empirical links identified are present either only or are particularly 
strong for the period since 1999, consistent with the argument that the 1997-98 Asian 
crisis may have constituted a more fundamental change in the objectives of policy-
makers, in particular with regard to exchange rate policy objectives. 
 
In sum, the findings of the paper suggest that an FX policy objective and concerns 
about an overheating of the domestic economy have been the two main motives for 
policies of capital flow management over the past two decades, and in particular in 
the 2000s. Capital controls – both the level and the likelihood of raising existing 
controls further – are strongly associated with countries with fixed exchange rate 
regimes and significantly undervalued exchange rates. As to the financial stability 
side, the evidence suggests that capital controls are less motivated by worries about 
financial market volatility, but rather by concerns about capital inflows triggering or 
contributing to an overheating of the economy – in the form of high credit growth, 
rising inflation and output volatility. Finally, the paper also uncovers evidence that 
suggests that capital controls have externalities across countries as countries are found 
to be more likely to raise controls when other countries in the region have done so 
recently. 
 
These findings have a number of policy implications. A first important point is that 
capital control measures seem to be used not in a purely defensive manner when it 
comes to FX policy – the presence and introduction of capital controls are not merely 
associated with avoiding an appreciation or overvaluation of the domestic currency, 
but rather are linked to a significant undervaluation of the exchange rate. This 
suggests that the concerns by policy-makers about “competitive devaluations” and 
“currency wars”, which have become so prominent in recent years, may not be 
unfounded. The competitive motive behind capital controls is moreover strengthened 
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countries have done so recently as well. 
 
As a second point, the evidence is consistent with the argument that capital flow 
management (CFM) policies are used to compensate for the absence of autonomous 
macroeconomic and financial policies and effective adjustment mechanisms. The fact 
that countries with a high level of capital controls, and those actively implementing 
controls, tend to be those that have fixed exchange rate regimes, have a non-IT 
monetary policy regime, and have shallow financial markets indicates that policy-
makers need to use capital controls to try and protect their economies against capital 
flows. Although the size of the capital flows is rather modest relative to the overall 
size of the economy in countries with higher capital controls, their effect on the 
domestic economy (credit growth, inflation and output volatility) tends to be large 
when other policy tools than capital controls, and deep financial markets to absorb 
those flows, are absent. 
 
The fact that countries with high capital controls exhibit a worse performance with 
regard to credit growth, inflation and output volatility – and introducing (additional) 
controls does not seem to lower these overheating pressures systematically in 
subsequent years – makes it very hard to see capital control measures as a first-best 
policy option. Instead, financial market development and the creation of policy 
frameworks allowing for autonomous and credible macroeconomic and prudential 
policies may constitute a superior path to shield the domestic economy from fickle 
capital flows. Of course, capital flow management policies are seen by some as 
temporary measures to “buy time” for policy-makers to enact more fundamental 
macroeconomic and prudential reforms. Yet a risk is that such policies not only create 
domestic and international distortions, but reduce incentives for policy makers to 
pursue such deeper reforms. The persistence or frequent re-introduction of capital 
control measures suggest that this risk may not be unfounded. 
 
Several caveats have to be emphasized. Most importantly, one needs to be very 
cautious in interpreting the relationships identified here as establishing a causal link. 
Not only are countries with different levels of capital controls different in a multitude 
of ways, but the introduction of capital controls is never a random event and may be 
triggered by factors not covered by those analyzed here. The approach of the present 
paper attempts to avoid these pitfalls as its primary objective is not to assess the 
effects or effectiveness of capital controls, but rather by analyzing and identifying 
differences in factors in the past, which are linked to decisions by policy-makers to 
maintain or changes in capital controls today. 
 
The paper proceeds by outlining the main arguments of both supporters and critics of 
capital controls in the current policy debate, and by reviewing some of the underlying 
academic literature, in section 2. Section 3 then describes the empirical methodology 
and the data used for the empirical analysis. Section 4 outlines the four main 
hypotheses to be tested and discusses the empirical findings. In the final section 5, the 
findings are summarized and implications for policy are drawn. 
  72. The pros and cons of capital controls 
 
Much of the recent policy debate has focused on the question under what 
circumstances capital controls may constitute a useful policy tool.
1 This issue has 
become so important in this debate because of the experience in particular of 
emerging market economies (EMEs) with capital flows during and after the 2007-08 
financial crisis. The sudden collapse of capital flows to and capital flight from many 
EMEs in the second half of 2008, and the subsequent surge in 2009 and 2010, put a 
lot of strain on domestic economies and financial markets in many EMEs.
2 
 
A helpful framework through which to consider the issue is in terms of market 
distortions and market failures: if markets work efficiently, capital is allocated 
optimally and any control on capital flows implies a distortion. Hence much of the 
policy discussion about the potential role of capital controls has concentrated on the 
question under which market failures capital controls may be welfare improving.  
 
A first type of distortion is related to international market failures. For instance, many 
EME policy-makers have argued that excessively loose monetary policy in the US 
and other advanced economies since 2009 has been “pushing” more capital into 
EMEs than warranted by underlying economic fundamentals. Other international 
distortions or market failures may relate to contagion and herd behavior of 
international investors which trigger excessive, temporary capital flows into some 
EMEs. Capital controls may thus reduce the adverse effects of such distortions on the 
domestic economies receiving excessively large capital inflows. In short, capital 
controls may play a useful policy role of capital flows are excessive, temporary and 
primarily due to “push factors”, i.e. factors that lie outside the control of domestic 
policy makers – so the line of reasoning. 
 
The second type of distortion or market failure that capital controls may be used to 
deal with are domestic in nature. Domestic distortions frequently emphasized have a  
macroprudential and microprudential origin: capital flows may exacerbate existing 
financial fragilities in economies that are particularly vulnerable, i.e. which have less 
financial development and depth, and weaker institutions for dealing with financial 
stability issues. Other domestic fragilities may relate to the balance sheets of domestic 
firms and households, which may be adversely affected by large fluctuations in 
capital flows.  
 
Taking the perspectives of both types of distortions, several policy-makers have 
argued that capital controls may thus be seen as a macroprudential policy tool as 
much as a macroeconomic policy tool. Looking at the whole set of available policy 
                                                 
1 The IMF has conducted substantial work in recent years on the issue of capital controls and their role 
in the policy mix, in particular in emerging markets, providing a number of papers that nicely outline 
the state of the debate and some underlying evidence – see Ostry et al. (2010, 2011) and Chamon et al. 
(2011). 
2 There is a rapidly growing literature discussing various elements of this experience, including on the 
drivers of capital flow cycles (sudden stops, reversals, surges and retrenchments) with a specific focus 
also on the 2007-08 crisis and its implications – see Forbes and Warnock (2011), Aizenman and 
Sushko (2011), Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2011), Raddatz and Schmukler (2011) and Fratzscher 
(2011). There is also a growing literature linking capital flows to contagion and the cross-border 
transmission of shocks – see e.g. Broner, Gelos and Reinhart (2006) and Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher 
and Mehl (2011). 
  8tools, capital controls may become an even more important tool in the pecking order 
of policies when other policies are constrained or not available at all. In particular, 
using an exchange rate appreciation as a buffer against a capital inflow surge is less 
feasible if an exchange rate is already overvalued, and if an economy already lacks 
competitiveness. Also using FX interventions to absorb inflows is less desirable if 




Moreover, the desirability of using capital controls to deal with capital flow 
fluctuations may depend on the space of monetary policy and fiscal policy. For 
instance, lowering interest rates to discourage capital inflows may not be a feasible 
policy option in an economy that has high inflation and is concerned about 
overheating. Similarly, fiscal policy tightening to reduce demand and counteract a 
surge in capital inflows may not be an option if fiscal policy is already tight and 
public debt high. 
 
In a nutshell, this has been the general reasoning of many proponents in favor of 
capital controls as a policy tool in the current debate. On the contrary, those who 
caution against the use of capital controls tend to point out that capital controls in 
many cases are not a first-best solution, but rather an inferior alternative to needed 
policy reforms – e.g. an improvement in macro- and microprudential supervision and 
regulation and a deepening of financial markets to deal with financial stability risks 
from capital flow fluctuations; an improvement in institutions and a reform of 
macroeconomic policy frameworks (in particular with regard to monetary policy, 
fiscal policy and exchange rate regimes); and the move towards flexible exchange rate 
regimes to obtain fully autonomous monetary and fiscal policies. 
 
In addition to being inferior policy responses, so these critics, the imposition and 
maintenance of capital controls may in fact delay those needed reforms, with 
substantial longer term costs to the domestic economy. Moreover, there is a huge 
literature investigating whether capital controls have been effective at all in dealing 
with capital flow fluctuations.
4 The findings in the literature do not yield compelling 
evidence in favor of an effectiveness of capital controls, although a consensus is 
emerging that while capital controls are easily circumvented and thus may not have a 
substantial effect on the volume, they appear to change the composition of capital 
flows towards less risky and volatile types of flows. 
 
There is also compelling evidence that capital controls of individual economies can 
have adverse externalities and consequences for the global economy – triggering calls 
for closer cooperation of capital flow management policies at the global level, in 
particular through the G20 process. One such externality occurs through exchange 
rate management: if capital controls are used in order to maintain or induce 
undervalued exchange rates, such a measure obviously comes at the expense of lower 
competitiveness of that country’s trading partners. In fact, following the 2007-08 
                                                 
3 For a discussion and evidence on the link between capital controls and exchange rate policy, see for 
instance the recent work by Jeanne (2011). 
4 For an overview of this literature and its findings see the excellent surveys of Magud, Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2011), Forbes (2007), Cardarelli, Elekdag and Kose (2009) and one for the 1980s and early 
1990s by Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1996). Henry (2007) provides a review of the broader 
experience with capital account liberalization. 
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“competitive devaluations”, or “currency wars” as Brazilian Finance Minister 
Mantega called it, due to countries using FX interventions and capital controls to 
weaken their currencies. The massive increase in FX reserve holdings as well as the 
widespread introduction of capital controls by EMEs are indications consistent with 
this argument. 
 
Another externality is that the imposition of controls in one country may make it 
politically more attractive and induce the adoption of similar controls by others, thus 
overall leading to serious impediments to financial globalization.
5 
 
A third type of externality may result when the introduction of capital controls 
induces a diversion of capital flows to other countries. For instance, there is evidence 
that the introduction and raising of capital controls on portfolio inflows by Brazil in 
2008-11 has caused a significant diversion effect and increase in capital inflows into 
other Latin American economies and also other EMEs outside Latin America.
6 Such 
externalities can be particularly strong for small EMEs when the economy imposing 
controls is as large as Brazil’s. Overall, this case highlights the importance of 
pursuing and adopting a coordinated approach to capital controls. 
 
 
3. Methodology and data 
 
This section starts by outlining the empirical approach for testing the four overarching 
potential motives for the use of capital controls, as stressed by the recent policy 
debate and outlined above: an FX policy objective; a capital flow management goal; a 
financial stability aim; and a macroeconomic policy objective.  
 
Importantly, the main intention is to identify the factors that distinguish countries 
according to their choice of capital controls, both the overall level of de jure 
restrictions maintained by a country, as well as the decision to either raise or lower 
existing controls. To identify the factors Xi,t of country i that relate to the level of 
capital controls (CC), the benchmark model to be estimated is formulated as 
 
t i t i t t i X CC , 1 , ,             (1) 
 
while the benchmark model to relate factors to the choice of changes in capital 
controls is 
 
t i t i t
CC
t i X D , 1 , ,             (2) 
 
Di,t is a dummy variable with Di,t=1 if a country raises capital controls in year t and 
Di,t=0 if it keeps existing controls unchanged. In a second model specification, the 
                                                 
5 See Prasad, Rogoff, Wei and Kose (2003) for a compelling overview of the arguments and underlying 
evidence on financial globalization. Many other benefits from financial globalization have been 
analyzed in the literature, in particular with regard to the diversification of risk and for investment (e.g. 
Curcuru et al. (2011), Hau and Rey (2005), Gelos and Wei (2005), and Rajan (2010)). 
6 Forbes, Fratzscher, Kostka and Straub (2011). Korinek (2010) provides a conceptual presentation of 
externalities and capital flows. 
  10estimation is conducted for cases when capital controls are lowered, so that Di,t=1 if a 
country lowers capital controls in year t and Di,t=0 if existing controls stay unchanged. 
Equation (1) is estimated via OLS and equation (2) using a logit specification.
7  
 
Moreover, three types of models are estimated. In a first step, each individual factor 
Xi,t is included separately (“individual models”); in a second step, all factors of a 
particular hypothesis are included together (“combined model”); and in a third step, 
an encompassing procedure reduce the model specification in a stepwise way so as to 
arrive at the model that includes only those factors that are statistically significant at 
least at the 20% level (“encompassing model”). 
 
Both models include time effects t so as to take into account that there is a general, 
common time trend in capital controls with capital controls generally decreasing over 
time, as will be discussed and shown below. The inclusion of time dummies in 
equation (2) is less obvious, yet in turns out that in particular the (re-)introduction of 
capital controls clustered in a few particular years of the sample.
8 Robust standard 
errors are reported throughout. 
 
An important issue is the potential endogeneity of capital controls. As discussed 
above, much of the literature focuses on the effect of capital controls on various 
macroeconomic and financial variables which raises the concern that such an effect 
cannot be cleanly identified since capital controls are likely to be a direct or indirect, 
endogenous result of the very same variables. This problem does not arise here as the 
analysis is interested in the question of merely characterizing and identifying those 
factors that are associated with differences in the level and changes of capital controls. 
However, the potential problem is that these factors may themselves be influenced by 
capital controls. The analysis tries to partly address this concern by analyzing past 
values of these factors, i.e. including the lagged values of the factors Xi,t-1. Of course 
this does not entirely solve the problem as both dependent and independent variables 
may be persistent over time; thus one needs to be careful when interpreting the 
parameter estimates in a causal way.
9 
 
The third part of the empirical analysis is an event study of the behavior of the factors 
Xi in the years before and after changes in capital controls. The main interest for this 
analysis is to understand whether fundamentals in countries raising capital controls in 
a particular year differ from those countries that kept controls constant and those 
countries that lowered existing controls. The identification of countries raising, 
                                                 
7 In alternative specifications, equation (1) is estimated allowing for censoring at the lower bound, as a 
number of observations of the dependent variable, as discussed below, lie at the lower/zero value of the 
dependent variable. Results are very similar to those using a linear OLS specification, with the OLS 
estimation being the ones shown below as parameter estimates are more easily interpreted. Moreover, 
equation (2) is alternatively estimated using a multinomial logit specification, which allows estimating 
both models (the one for increase in capital controls, and the one for lowering in controls) in a single 
model, though yielding identical parameter estimates. 
8 As one would expect, empirically the inclusion of time effects matters little in the estimation of 
equation (2), but is crucial for equation (1). 
9 Various approaches have been employed in the literature to deal with the endogeneity issue of capital 
controls, such as using instrumental-variable approaches. However, these approaches are not free of 
pitfalls either, in particular as it is inherently difficult to identify appropriate instruments. Another 
challenge relates to the non-stationarity of the dependent variable in equation (1). Various test statistics 
are used to check, and confirm, the stationarity of the residuals. 
  11lowering and keeping constant their controls is the same as for equation (2) above. 
Again, the potential endogeneity of capital control policies means that the 




The analysis is conducted for a broad set of 79 countries, using annual data, for the 
period 1984-2009. Table 1 shows the countries included in the sample, indicating that 
the sample is dominated by emerging market economies, which constitute about half 
of the countries. The sample and time period are mainly determined by data 
availability of the capital controls variables. 
 
A key issue is the measurement of capital controls, which is inherently difficult. The 
capital control measures by Chinn and Ito (2011) as well as Schindler (2009) are used 
here to proxy the de jure financial openness of countries. Importantly, both are de jure 
measures, thus providing indications about the intentions of policy makers rather than 
the actual outcome or de facto openness and integration of countries. The former 
proxy has a broader coverage and a longer time series, hence it is the preferred 
measure in the analysis, although various robustness checks show that the empirical 
findings are very similar when using other proxies for de jure openness.
10 Both 




Figures 1 – 2 
 
Figure 1 plots the evolution over time of the average degree of capital controls as well 
as the standard deviation of controls across countries at any point in time. The figure 
shows compellingly the overall trend towards fewer controls and more liberalization, 
although the dispersion across countries remains significant throughout the period and 
even rises towards the end of the 2000s. This is a powerful illustration that cross-
country differences in capital controls globally have never been as dispersed as they 
are today. 
 
Figure 2 shows the share of countries which raised capital controls, the share that 
lowered controls and the one that kept controls unchanged during a particular year. 
The figure reveals an interesting pattern, with sharp increases in capital controls 
occurring in many countries during the second half of the 1990s – during and 
following the Asian crisis, as well as in 2009 – after the global financial crisis of 
2007-08. What is striking is that 2009 was the first year since the mid-1980s during 
which more countries raised capital controls than countries lowering them. 
 
Tables 2 – 3 
                                                 
10  There are various strengths and advantages to the measure proposed by Schindler (2009), in 
particular its greater detail and break-down of individual types and categories of capital controls. The 
main interest for the present paper is the dimension that refers to restrictions of the capital account, 
which is used for the analysis, although also this measure is highly correlated with the Chinn-Ito 
measure. Moreover, a feature exploited for some of the analysis here is the distinction of the Schindler 
proxy between restrictions on capital inflows and controls of outflows. 
11 For simplicity reasons, the paper uses throughout the term “capital controls”, though strictly speaking 
the proxies include restrictions e.g. on FX or current account transactions. 
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Finally, a broad set of potential proxies is used to test the 4 hypotheses discussed 
above. Table 2 provides an overview of the definition of the variables, while Table 3 
gives some summary statistics. Note that for the empirical analysis below, all factors 
are normalized to have a zero mean and a standard deviation of unity in order to make 
the parameter estimates more easily comparable across variables. 
 
As to the hypothesis that capital controls are related to FX policy, seven FX variables 
are analyzed. A first key variable is the degree of exchange rate misalignment, so as 
to test whether having an undervalued or overvalued exchange rate is associated with 
a different level of capital controls and whether or not it triggers active decisions by 
policy-makers to raise or lower existing restrictions. The main measure of FX 
overvaluation used stems from behavioral (BEER) and fundamental (FEER) 
equilibrium exchange rate models for real effective exchange rates. As this variable is 
an important focus of the present paper, several alternative proxies for FX 
misalignment are used and based on deviations from a linear trend or from period 
averages of real effective exchange rates (REER), nominal effective exchange rates 
(NEER) and bilateral exchange rates vis-à-vis the main anchor currencies. While the 
estimates shown below are based on the FX overvaluation measures from the 
structural BEER and FEER models, those estimates are robust to using such proxies 
of misalignments from trend.
12 
 
Other FX policy variables that policy-makers may react to in their decision about 
capital controls are the past trend appreciation of the REER, the short-term, three-
month money market interest rate differential vis-à-vis the anchor currency country, 
and the exchange rate volatility (measured as the standard deviation of monthly REER 
movements during the previous year). Recall that all these variables are included in 
the model estimation of equations (1) and (2) are based on lagged values (the previous 
year) so as to take into account that e.g. changes in capital controls are likely to affect 
FX variables themselves contemporaneously.  
 
In addition, the test of FX policy hypothesis also includes the level of FX reserves as 
a share of GDP, a dummy for the exchange rate regime (taking the value of one if a 
currency is classified by the IMF as being freely floating) and a dummy for whether 
countries have an inflation targeting (IT) monetary policy strategy (taking a value of 
one if the country is using an IT strategy). The priors are that countries with a floating 
exchange rate regime and an IT regime are more likely to also have fewer restrictions 
on capital flows. The prior for FX reserves is more difficult to gauge. On the one hand, 
FX reserve accumulation and a fixed exchange rate regime may be complements as 
both may be used to stabilize the country’s currency. This would imply also that more 
reserves are linked to more capital account restrictions. On the other hand, FX 
reserves and capital account openness may be negatively correlated, e.g. a country 
with a closed capital account may not need to intervene heavily in FX markets to 
stabilize the domestic currency. 
 
As to the second hypothesis, the capital flow hypothesis, the level, the change and the 
volatility of capital flows are used as proxies to gauge whether capital controls are 
                                                 
12 Data for REER and NEER stem from BIS and IMF. Bilateral exchange rates are mostly taken vis-à-
vis the US dollar, with the exception for European currencies, for which the euro that is taken as anchor 
currency. 
  13related to fluctuations in capital flows. Overall capital inflows and outflows (portfolio 
flows plus other investment flows, which mostly includes bank loans) as well as more 
narrowly net portfolio flows are analyzed in the empirical test. Changes in flows are 
percentage changes relative to the previous year; the volatility of flows the standard 
deviation of monthly flows. 
 
Note that all capital flow proxies are measured as a share of domestic GDP. This is an 
important point to keep in mind because when e.g. people talk about “excessive” 
capital flows, they may have different benchmarks in mind. For instance, a given 
volume of capital inflows may not be large overall when measured against the overall 
size of the economy, but these flows may be very large when compared to the size of 
the domestic financial sector. The reason for normalizing flows by GDP is to be able 
to distinguish the size of capital flows per se from the importance of other factors and 
characteristics, which are analyzed separately under the financial stability hypothesis 
below. 
 
Third, a number of alternative proxies are used to test for the role of a financial 
stability objectives of capital controls. Institutional indicators of financial sector 
development as well as the stock market capitalization relative to GDP are employed 
as two alternative proxies for financial market depth and development of a country. 
The prior is that policy-makers are more likely to maintain a higher level of capital 
controls or raise capital controls when the domestic financial sector is more shallow, 
so that external and domestic shocks more readily may have an adverse effect on the 
domestic financial system and the domestic economy.  
 
As a second dimension, the analysis tests for the role of financial stress; the prior 
being that higher financial stress should be positively correlated with capital control 
measures. The IMF’s financial stress index (which is a composite of returns and 
volatility in equity, bond and money markets) as well as specifically equity market 
volatility (standard deviation of monthly returns) are used as proxies. Third, to get at 
the role of overheating and asset price bubbles, the analysis includes credit growth 
(the change in credit flows to the private sector, relative to GDP) as well as the 
change in domestic equity returns as well as the deviation of equity returns from 
period averages (equity valuation) are included as proxies. The prior here is clear, 
with more financial stress or asset price rises in the previous year expected to be 
positively related to capital controls. 
 
As to the fourth and final hypothesis, the role of the real economy and external 
stability for the choice of capital flow management measures, the GDP growth rate, 
GDP growth volatility (standard deviation of quarterly growth rates over the past two 
years), the CPI inflation rate, the current account to GDP ratio, trade openness 
(exports plus imports over GDP), as well as the ratio of public debt to GDP and of 
external debt to GDP are included. Most priors as to the relationship with capital 
controls are clear with regard to these proxies, possibly with the exception of trade 
openness. One the one hand, more trade openness may imply that a country is more 
exposed to external shocks, hence potentially providing an incentive for domestic 
policy-makers to try and shield the domestic economy from such shocks by restricting 
the mobility of capital into and out of the country. One the other hand, there is solid 
evidence in the literature that capital flows “piggy back” trade, i.e. there is a positive 
relationship between both for financing reasons of trade and for risk-sharing motives. 
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4. Testing the four hypotheses – the empirical results 
 
This section presents and discusses the results, going systematically through each of 
the four hypotheses in turn.  
 
4.1 FX policy 
 
The analysis first turns to the role of FX policy as a motivation for capital controls. 
Table 4.A presents the estimates of equation (1) for the level of controls, while Table 
4.B shows the estimates for equation (2) for the changes in controls. The last columns 
of each table indicate the conceptual prior about the expected signs of the coefficients, 
based on the discussion in the previous section. 
 
Recall from above that for each hypothesis three types of models are estimated and 
presented: “individual models” including each factor separately; a “combined model” 
capturing all factors of a particular hypothesis together; and an “encompassing 





Overall, there is significant evidence that the level and changes in capital controls are 
related to FX policy. In particular, there is a close link between the undervaluation of 
exchange rates and capital control policies. Since 1999, an undervalued exchange rate 
is associated with a higher level of capital controls. Moreover, countries with 
undervalued exchange rates are more likely to have raised capital controls since 1999. 
 
Capital controls are also significantly related to other elements of concern for FX 
policy: higher REER volatility is associated with a higher level of capital controls 
(especially since 1999) and is more likely to trigger an increase in capital controls. 
Similarly, a trend depreciation of the REER is also linked to both a higher level and a 
lower probability of policy-makers reducing capital controls since 1999. 
 
There is another key dimension that connects capital controls and FX policy, namely 
the exchange rate regime and the underlying monetary policy regime of a country. 
Managing to contain the volatility and volume of capital flows through capital 
controls may make it easier for policy-makers to maintain a fixed exchange rate 
regime. Countries having a flexible currency regime and an inflation-targeting 
monetary policy regime are less likely to need capital controls to achieve their policy 
objectives. The findings of the empirical analysis are consistent with this argument, as 
countries with flexible exchange rate regimes and those with an inflation targeting 
(IT) regime tend to be more open financially. Moreover, since 1999 countries with 
inflation targeting regimes have much more frequently reduced existing capital 
controls than non-IT countries. 
 
Table 5 and Figure 3 
 
How important are these effects overall? Table 5 tries to gauge the relevance of the 
various factors by looking at the interdecile range of the marginal effects. Concretely, 
  15the table displays how much the capital control measure, on average, is explained by 
differences in each of the factors analyzed when comparing countries with a value of 
a factor at the 10
th percentile of the entire distribution (of countries and over time) 
with countries with a value of the same factor at the 90
th percentile of the distribution. 
For instance, a country with a high degree of overvaluation at a particular point in 
time (i.e. at the 90
th percentile of the FX overvaluation variable) has a level of capital 
controls which is, on average, 2.55 lower than a country with a low degree of 
overvaluation (i.e. a high degree of undervaluation – at the 10
th percentile of the FX 
overvaluation variable). The value of 2.55 is about one full standard deviation of the 
capital control level variable; hence overall a quite sizeable magnitude. 
 
Figure 3 provides a visualization of the relationship of FX overvaluation and the level 
of capital controls, and the same fore the FX volatility variable. Especially for FX 
overvaluation there is quite a decent fit in the relationship between overvaluation and 




For the event study, Figure 4 shows the evolution of four of the FX policy variables 
around changes (either increases or reductions) in capital controls. In particular, the 
event study indicates that the degree of undervaluation increases in the years 
following large rises in capital controls. Moreover, countries with high exchange rate 
volatility do not only tend to have significantly higher levels of capital controls but 
are also more likely to raise capital controls. 
 
What is also striking is the evidence for inflation targeting. Countries with IT regimes 
are much more likely to reduce capital controls than keep them constant. By contrast, 
countries that raise capital controls tend to go even in the opposite direction by being 
less likely to have an IT regime in the years after raising capital controls. 
 
Tables 6 – 8 
 
Finally, a battery of robustness tests is conducted to check for the sensitivity of the 
estimates. Table 6 presents the benchmark estimates when using the alternative capital 
control measure by Schindler (2009). The table indicates that the estimates are 
qualitatively very similar to those using the Chinn-Ito measure. Next, Table 7 
provides estimates when splitting controls on inflows from controls on outflows. The 
findings overall are qualitatively very similar for controls on inflows and outflows. 
Also distinguishing across country groups (Table 8) does not yield systematically 
different findings, though of course some coefficients may lose or gain significance in 
alternative models. Several other robustness tests were conducted that are not shown 
here for brevity reasons.
13  
 
In summary, the evidence shown points quite strongly towards FX policy motives, in 
particular with regard to maintaining undervalued exchange rates, being an important 
                                                 
13 For instance, one of the strengths of the Schindler measure is that it allows distinguishing between 
controls across different types of investment. Again, the estimates did not show a pattern that would 
point at systematic differences across categories. Moreover, also equation (2) for changes was 
estimated using these alternative capital control proxies with similar empirical findings as for the 
presented benchmark results, and the same holds for the estimates for the other three hypotheses. 
  16objectives behind capital control policies, both for maintaining a high level of capital 
controls and for raising the likelihood to raise capital controls at times. 
 
 
4.2 Capital flows 
 
The section turns next to analyzing the potential role of the second hypothesis, namely 
whether and to what extent capital flow management policies are influenced by a 
capital flow objective.  
 
Table 9 and Figure 5 
 
Overall, Table 9 indicates that there is no compelling evidence that either the level of 
or changes in capital flows per se are an important motive for capital controls. In fact, 
higher levels of gross capital inflows, gross capital outflows and changes in net 
portfolio flows are associated with a lower level of capital controls (Table 9.A). 
Moreover, having experienced higher capital inflows, portfolio inflows or net 
portfolio flow volatility in the previous year reduces the probability of countries 
raising capital controls (Table 9.B). 
 
These findings underline the importance, as discussed in detail above, for being 
cautious in not interpreting these findings necessarily in a causal way. Importantly, 
countries with high capital flows are likely to be different in many other ways from 
countries with a relatively lower volume and/or volatility of capital flows. Specifically, 
capital flows here are measured relative to the size of the domestic economy, rather 
than the size e.g. of the domestic financial sector. As discussed above, this has been a 
deliberate choice in order to distinguish the size and volatility of capital flows per se 
from other potential factors influencing the choice of capital controls, such as related 
to financial stability objectives.  
 
Nevertheless, an important finding emerging from the analysis here is that there is no 
systematic evidence that links a larger magnitude and a higher volatility of capital 
flows per se with more capital flow restrictions. This evidence is corroborated by the 
event study of Figure 5, which shows that in particular net portfolio flows decline in 
the years following significant increases in capital controls. 
 
 
4.3 Financial stability 
 
The third hypothesis relates to the role of financial stability objectives for policy-
makers to choose a capital control regime.  
 
Table 10 and Figure 6 
 
The evidence shown in Table 10 uncovers an ambiguous relationship between 
financial stability objectives and the level and changes in capital controls. Countries 
with deeper financial markets are those with a lower level of capital controls and are 
also less likely to raise capital controls. This holds for both proxies of financial 
market depths, the institutional indicator employed (“financial depth”) and the market 
based measure (“Stock market capitalization”).  
  17 
Second, countries with more financial stress (in bond, equity and money markets) in 
prior years tend to have lower levels of capital controls and are also more likely to 
liberalize their capital account. 
 
Third, the evidence is much stronger for the role of credit growth. Here the findings 
suggest that countries with high rates of credit growth to the private sector in the 
previous year not only have a higher level of capital controls, but are also more likely 
to raise existing controls further. Table 5 indicates that this effect is indeed 
economically meaningful as the credit growth variable is one of the three most 
important variables in terms of magnitude explained of the differences in the level of 
capital controls across countries and over time. 
 
The event study of Figure 6 indicates that credit growth is not only higher in prior 
years for countries deciding to raise capital controls than for those lowering controls 
or keeping them constant, but credit growth also declines markedly during and after 
the (re-)introduction or raising of capital controls. 
 
Overall, the evidence on financial stability suggests that it is not financial market 
stress that motivates decisions about raising and maintaining high levels of capital 
controls, but it is rather the rate of credit growth that is linked to capital control 
measures. This points rather to policy-makers’ concerns about an overheating of the 
real economy than about financial markets per se. 
 
 
4.4 Real economy and external stability 
 
As to the fourth and final hypothesis, the analysis now turns to the role of real 
economy and external stability objectives for capital control measures. 
 
Table 11 and Figure 7 
 
The evidence of Table 11 indicates that countries with high inflation and high 
volatility in GDP growth both have a higher a level of capital controls and are more 
likely to raise existing capital controls. By contrast, countries that are more open to 
trade tend to have lower levels of capital controls and are more likely to reduce 
existing controls. This confirms the prior discussed in section 3 that there is a positive 
relationship between trade and financial openness. 
 
Moreover, there is little evidence that levels and changes in capital controls are 
systematically linked to the level of public debt or external debt. After 1999, there is 
some indication though that countries with a higher external debt have been less likely 
to lower capital controls and more likely to keep existing restrictions. 
 
As to the event study of Figure 7, there is no indication that either inflation rates or 
GDP volatility decline in years after the introduction of capital controls. Again, this 
needs to be interpreted cautiously as one lacks the proper counterfactual of would 
have happened to these variables if capital controls had not been changed for these 
countries, but they are suggestive that a reduction in inflation and output volatility did 
not materialize rapidly after increases in capital controls. 
  184.5 Joint test of four hypotheses 
 
As the final step of the analysis, the various hypotheses are tested jointly together in a 
single estimation. A key challenge of estimating all four hypotheses individually is, of 
course, that variables for different hypotheses may be correlated with one another, 
hence that tests of individual hypotheses may suffer from an omitted variable bias. On 
the other hand, given the large number of variables it is impossible to combine all four 
hypotheses in a meaningful way by including all variables simultaneously in the 
estimations.  
 
As a middle way between these two, I choose to focus on those variables that have 
been identified as important determinants in the individual hypothesis tests above. In 
particular, the overvaluation and FX regime variables are included for the FX 
hypothesis, credit growth and inflation as proxies for overheating, and financial depth 
for the degree of financial market development. 
 
Importantly, there may an additional determinant of capital controls, which has been 
discussed in detail in the introduction, and that is a potential externality of capital 
controls in that e.g. high controls or the raising of capital controls in some countries 
may make it more likely for other countries to follow suit and act in a similar way. 
Such an externality may be captured by including an additional variable (“Capital 
controls region”) that measures the average level or average change of capital controls 




Table 12 shows the parameter estimates for this combined test of equation (1), using 
OLS, for the “level” estimations and of equation (2), using a logit model, for the 
estimation for “changes” in capital controls. Importantly, all of the findings for the 
single-hypothesis tests above are confirmed when combining the different variables in 
a single model. The only variable that loses somewhat in significance is the financial 
depth variable. 
 
Moreover, the variable of capital controls in the region to capture externalities from 
capital controls is highly significant and large in magnitude. For the estimation for 
changes, this implies that countries are more likely to raise controls as well as lower 
controls when other countries in the region have done so recently. In addition, the 
magnitude of the coefficients becomes much larger after 1999, suggesting that such 
externalities have become more important in the 2000s. 
 
Overall, the evidence on the real economy and on financial stability of the previous 
subsection suggest that concerns about an overheating of the economy – in the form 
of high credit growth, rising inflation and output volatility – rather than narrow 
financial market concerns, are an important motive for the decisions of policy-makers 






  195. Conclusions 
 
The intention of the paper has been to gauge the motives of policy-makers to use 
capital controls as an active policy tool. Hence, the intended contribution of the 
present paper is not to analyze whether capital controls are effective in achieving their 
objectives – as a sizeable literature has been trying to establish – but rather to 
understand what drives policy-makers in their decisions to use capital flow 
restrictions.  
 
The findings of the paper suggest that FX policy management has been a central 
motive for policy-makers to use capital controls. Countries with a high level of capital 
controls and countries actively raising existing controls are those that tend to have 
undervalued exchange rates and a high degree of exchange rate volatility. 
 
Moreover, the choice of capital flow restrictions is closely linked to countries choices 
about the exchange rate regime and the monetary policy regime. The findings of the 
paper suggest that countries with a high level of capital flow restrictions tend be those 
with fixed exchange rates and those with other regimes than inflation targeting (IT). 
Moreover, countries with fixed exchange rates and non-IT regimes have been much 
more likely to raise capital controls over the past decade. 
 
The analysis of the paper finds no systematic evidence for a link between capital 
controls and a high volume or volatility of capital flows per se. There is also no 
compelling evidence that policy decisions about capital controls is related to a high 
degree of financial market stress or volatility. It seems that choices about capital flow 
restrictions, in particular over the past decade, have been rather motivated by concerns 
about an overheating of the domestic economy – in the form of high credit growth, 
inflation and output volatility. 
 
Taken together, the evidence suggests that both an FX policy objective and concerns 
about domestic overheating are the key motives for capital flow management policies 
over the past decade. Hence capital controls have not merely been associated with 
preventing an overvaluation or appreciation of the domestic currency, but rather with 
a significant undervaluation of the exchange rate. This provides support to those who 
have warned against the use of policies that trigger “competitive devaluations” and 
“currency wars”.  
 
Moreover, the evidence indicates that capital controls may frequently be used to 
compensate for the absence of autonomous and independent monetary policy. 
Countries that have fixed exchange rate regimes and shallow financial markets have 
little ability to use monetary policy to deal with domestic overheating pressures. 
Hence even relatively modest capital inflows or volatility in flows pose a serious 
challenge to domestic policy-makers and may induce them to use capital flow 
restrictions. 
 
Putting these pieces of evidence together make it hard to see how capital flow 
management policies can be a first-best solution to domestic policy challenges. It may 
indeed be the case that the imposition of capital controls may help to “buy time” for 
domestic policy makers to address underlying economic, institutional and policy 
weaknesses at home. Yet the risk is that these policy choices become entrenched and 
  20reduce the urgency and incentives of policy-makers to address the true root causes of 
domestic vulnerabilities to fluctuations in capital flows. The persistence and frequent 
re-introduction of capital control measures in recent years suggest that this risk may 
become a reality. 
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Notes: The chart shows the evolution of (normalized) capital controls, using the measure of Chinn and 
Ito (2011), for the average across all 79 countries of the sample, as well as providing the dispersion – 
the standard deviation across countries for each year – since 1984. 
 
















Notes: The chart shows the evolution of the changes in (normalized) capital controls, using the 
measure of Chinn and Ito (2011). Specifically, the figure shows the share of countries raising capital 
controls, lowering them or keeping them constant, as a share of all 79 countries of the sample for each 
year since 1984. 
 
  25Figure 3: Capital controls and exchange rate policy 
 












































































0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6
FX volatility
 
Notes: The figure shows the values of the capital control measure against the values for FX 
overvaluation (panel A) and FX volatility (panel B) for all countries and each of the years 2003-2007, 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Australia Italy Algeria Ecuador Morocco Slovenia Armenia Malawi
Belgium Japan Argentina Hungary Pakistan South Africa Burundi Moldova
Canada New Zealand Bolivia India Paraguay Thailand Congo, DR Nicaragua
Denmark Norway Brazil Indonesia Peru Tunisia Costa Rica Nigeria
Finland Portugal Chile Israel Philippines Turkey Dominican Rep
Table 1: Country sample 
 
uPapua New Guinea
France Spain China Korea Poland Ukraine Fiji Samoa
Germany Sweden Colombia Latvia Romania Uruguay Gambia Sierra Leone
Greece Switzerland Croatia Malaysia Russian FeVenezuela, RB Ghana Solomon Islands
Iceland United Kingdom Cyprus Malta Singapore Guyana Trinidad and Tobago








FX overvaluation FX overvaluation based on behavioural (BEER) and 
fundamental (FEER) equilibrium exchange rate models 
for REER
Bussiere et al. (2010)
Trend appreciation Appreciation of the REER over past year BIS, IMF
Interest rate differential Three-month money market interest rate differential vis-
à-vis anchor currency country (US or euro area)
BIS, IMF
FX volatility Standard deviation of monthly REER changes BIS, IMF
FX reserves - level FX reserves to GDP ratio IMF
FX regime -- float dummy - value of one if a currency is classified as 
freely floating, zero otherwise
IMF classification
IT regime dummy - value of one if the country is using an IT 
strategy (including "IT light"), zero otherwise
IMF, Stone et al., ECB
Capital flows
Capital outflows Gross outflows of portfolio investment and other 
investment as a share of GDP
IMF
Capital inflows Gross inflows of portfolio investment and other 
investment as a share of GDP
IMF
Net portfolio flows Net portfolio investment flows as a share of GDP IMF
Change capital outflows Change in gross outflows relative to last year IMF
Change capital inflows Change in gross inflows relative to last year IMF
Change net portfolio flows Change in net portfolio flows relative to last year IMF




Financial depth Institutional index of financial development (inverted): 
higher value = less financial depth
Dorrucci et al. (2009)
Financial Stress Index Composite of returns and volatility in equity, bond and 
money markets
IMF
Stock market capitalisation Stock market capitalisation to GDP ratio Datastream
Equity market returns Change in equity return index Datastream
Equity return volatility Standard deviation of monthly equity returns Datastream
Credit growth Change in credit flows to the private sector, relative to 
GDP
IMF
Equity valuation Deviation of annual equity returns from trend Datastream
Real economy and external stability
GDP growth Annual GDP growth rate IMF
GDP growth volatility Standard deviation of monthly net portfolio flows to 
GDP during the previous year
IMF
Inflation rate CPI inflation rate IMF
Current account / GDP Current account to GDP ratio IMF
Trade openness Exports plus import to GDP ratio IMF
Public Debt / GDP Public debt to GDDP ratio GDI
External debt / GDP External debt to GDP ratio GDI
 
  32Table 3: Summary statistics 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
FX policy
FX overvaluation 7.175 17.663 -21.649 45.700
Trend appreciation -0.005 0.127 -19.922 26.606
Interest rate differential 7.530 18.671 -7.810 69.150
FX volatility 0.034 0.064 0 1.735
FX reserves - level 0.136 0.154 0.036 1.583
FX regime -- float 0.143 0.350 0 1
IT regime 0.133 0.340 0 1
Capital flows
Capital outflows -0.001 0.275 -0.402 0.853
Capital inflows 0.001 0.189 -0.544 0.505
Net portfolio flows 0.004 0.067 -0.737 0.750
Change capital outflows -0.007 0.339 -0.284 0.190
Change capital inflows 0.003 0.218 -0.298 0.233
Change net portfolio flows -0.001 0.068 -0.402 0.382
Capital flow volatility 0.036 0.087 0.000 0.853
Financial stability
Financial depth 0.428 0.627 0.000 8.125
Financial Stress Index -0.069 2.707 -5.619 15.150
Stock market capitalisation 0.473 0.602 0.000 2.425
Equity market returns 0.007 0.043 -0.169 0.773
Equity return volatility 0.033 0.034 0.000 1.094
Credit growth 1.971 23.057 0.003 52.104
Equity valuation 7.175 17.663 -21.649 45.700
Real economy and external stability
GDP growth 0.040 0.027 -0.151 0.177
GDP growth volatility 0.013 0.012 0.001 0.113
Inflation rate 8.331 5.394 -2.176 267.067
Current account / GDP -0.004 0.051 -0.224 0.238
Trade openness 0.816 0.473 0.003 4.729
Public Debt / GDP 0.584 0.392 0.050 2.898
External debt / GDP 0.177 0.282 0.003 0.734
 
  33Table 4:  FX policy (Hypothesis 1)  
 
A. Level of capital controls 
 
Hypothesis
level level level level
FX overvaluation -0.137 -0.600 -0.828** –
(0.271) (0.459) (0.372)
Trend appreciation -0.213*** -0.143 -0.225*** –
(0.0758) (0.147) (0.0704)
Interest rate differential 0.645*** 0.406** 0.657*** 0.161*** +
(0.139) (0.183) (0.135) (0.0314)
FX volatility 0.424** 0.941*** 0.430** 1.026*** +
(0.181) (0.243) (0.180) (0.219)
FX reserves - level -0.0172 0.148 0.143 +
(0.0564) (0.0974) (0.0950)
FX regime -- float -1.061*** -0.790*** -1.027*** -0.778*** –
(0.139) (0.192) (0.116) (0.156)
IT regime 0.0677 -0.0219 –
(0.155) (0.193)
Observations 778 397 778 397
C o u n t r i e s 7 97 97 97 9








B. Changes in capital controls 
 
reduce raise reduce raise reduce raise reduce raise reduce raise
FX overvaluation 0.780 -0.312 1.315 -0.673 -0.613* + –
(0.767) (0.442) (1.594) (0.437) (0.369)
Trend appreciation -0.0835 0.494** 0.852* 0.127 0.444** 0.841* + –
(0.151) (0.227) (0.510) (0.374) (0.213) (0.478)
Interest rate different 0.253 0.000671 -0.146 0.0218 0.633*** – +
(0.182) (0.204) (0.292) (0.270) (0.0367)
FX FX volatility 0.552* 0.584 1.688*** 1.424*** 0.610 1.471*** 1.375*** – +
(0.283) (0.402) (0.474) (0.538) (0.373) (0.442) (0.437)
FX reserves - level 0.112 0.115 0.398* 0.112 0.450** – +
(0.121) (0.112) (0.206) (0.155) (0.196)
FX regime -- float -0.650 0.0739 -1.149* -0.0706 -0.982* + –
(0.407) (0.385) (0.603) (0.611) (0.553)
IT regime 0.755** -0.391 1.622*** -0.0108 1.623*** + –
(0.345) (0.436) (0.543) (0.662) (0.543)
Observations 778 772 397 397 778 772 397 397
Countries 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79








Notes: The table shows the parameter estimates of equation (1), using OLS, in panel A and of equation 
(2), using a logit model, in panel B. The columns “Hypothesis” provide the priors for the signs of the 
respective coefficients. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, 90% levels, respectively. 
 




FX overvaluation – -2.55
Trend appreciation – -0.27
Interest rate differential +0 . 1 4
FX volatility +1 . 7 3
FX reserves - level +0 . 2 1
FX regime -- float – -0.77
IT regime –
Capital flows
Capital outflows + -0.33
Capital inflows + -0.21
Net portfolio flows + 0.19
Change capital outflows + -0.09
Change capital inflows +
Change net portfolio flows + -0.24
Capital flow volatility + 0.13
Financial stability
Financial depth – -0.59
Financial Stress Index +  /  ? -0.34
Stock market capitalisation – -1.10
Equity market returns –
Equity return volatility + 0.21
Credit growth +  /  ? 1.66
Equity valuation – -0.55
Real economy
GDP growth – 0.32
GDP growth volatility + 0.34
Inflation rate + 0.84
Current account / GDP – -0.20
Trade openness –   /   ? -0.29
Public Debt / GDP +
External debt / GDP + -0.14
 
 
Notes: The column labeled “interdecile” shows the difference in the level of capital controls for a 
country with the respective factor at its 90th percentile compared to a country with the same factor at 
the 10th percentile. 
 
  35Table 6:  FX policy (Hypothesis 1) – Robustness 
Alternative proxy of capital controls (Schindler) 
 
Level of capital controls 
 
Hypothesis
level level level level
FX overvaluation -0.0800 -0.461*** -0.388** –
(0.112) (0.174) (0.156)
Trend appreciation -0.0377 0.0269 -0.0444* –
(0.0293) (0.0468) (0.0258)
Interest rate differential 0.0829*** 0.0359 0.0895*** 0.0418 +
(0.0302) (0.0362) (0.0267) (0.0308)
FX volatility 0.111* 0.127* 0.112** 0.122* +
(0.0571) (0.0731) (0.0567) (0.0727)
FX reserves - level 0.0371* 0.0595** 0.0366* 0.0603** +
(0.0208) (0.0299) (0.0208) (0.0299)
FX regime -- float -0.142*** -0.0752 -0.138*** -0.106** –
(0.0508) (0.0675) (0.0386) (0.0506)
IT regime 0.00766 -0.0532 –
(0.0498) (0.0644)
Observations 352 220 352 220
C o u n t r i e s 7 97 97 97 9







Notes: The table shows the parameter estimates of equation (1), using OLS – the capital control 
measure used here is the one by Schindler (2009). The columns “Hypothesis” provide the priors for the 




  36Table 7:  FX policy (Hypothesis 1) – Robustness 
Controls on inflows versus outflows (alternative proxy of capital controls 
of Schindler) 
 
A.  Level of capital controls on inflows 
 
Hypothesis
level level level level
FX overvaluation -0.0664 -0.318** -0.320** –
(0.0871) (0.149) (0.129)
Trend appreciation -0.0234 0.0179 -0.0285 –
(0.0243) (0.0407) (0.0220)
Interest rate differential 0.0574** 0.0169 0.0618*** +
(0.0251) (0.0286) (0.0217)
FX volatility 0.0748 0.0978 0.0746 0.104* +
(0.0489) (0.0668) (0.0487) (0.0577)
FX reserves - level 0.0142 0.0283 +
(0.0181) (0.0269)
FX regime -- float -0.138*** -0.104* -0.116*** -0.109*** –
(0.0427) (0.0596) (0.0329) (0.0408)
IT regime 0.0464 0.0153 –
(0.0421) (0.0578)
Observations 352 220 352 220
C o u n t r i e s 7 97 97 97 9








B.  Level of capital controls on outflows 
 
Hypothesis
level level level level
FX overvaluation -0.0935 -0.603*** -0.562*** –
(0.147) (0.213) (0.187)
Trend appreciation -0.0519 0.0359 -0.0602* –
(0.0359) (0.0578) (0.0312)
Interest rate differential 0.108*** 0.0550 0.115*** 0.0722* +
(0.0371) (0.0470) (0.0330) (0.0392)
FX volatility 0.146** 0.157* 0.150** 0.125 +
(0.0706) (0.0901) (0.0697) (0.0872)
FX reserves - level 0.0599** 0.0906*** 0.0607** 0.0926*** +
(0.0242) (0.0333) (0.0245) (0.0332)
FX reserves - change –
FX regime -- float -0.147** -0.0465 -0.164*** –
(0.0624) (0.0798) (0.0468)
IT regime -0.0310 -0.122 -0.142** –
(0.0613) (0.0751) (0.0568)
Observations 352 220 352 220
C o u n t r i e s 7 97 97 97 9







Notes: The table shows the parameter estimates of equation (1), using OLS – the capital control 
measures used here are the total inflow controls (panel A) and the total outflow controls (panel B) of 
Schindler (2009). The columns “Hypothesis” provide the priors for the signs of the respective 
coefficients. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, 90% levels, respectively. 
 
  37Table 8:  FX policy (Hypothesis 1) – Robustness 
Alternative country samples 
 
A.  Level of capital controls – EMEs only 
 
Hypothesis
level level level level
FX overvaluation -0.279 -0.926 -0.799* –
(0.310) (0.648) (0.447)
Trend appreciation -0.168 -0.300 -0.163 -0.302** –
(0.142) (0.187) (0.103) (0.140)
Interest rate differential -0.0392 -0.0884 -0.0656*** +
(0.121) (0.181) (0.0220)
FX volatility 0.197 0.0624 0.260 +
(0.206) (0.299) (0.164)
FX reserves - level -0.491*** -0.323*** -0.493*** -0.304*** +
(0.0533) (0.0897) (0.0481) (0.0774)
FX regime -- float -0.581** -0.497** -0.570*** -0.433** –
(0.242) (0.250) (0.192) (0.183)
IT regime -0.0707 -0.130 –
(0.194) (0.223)
Observations 347 212 347 212
Countries 38 38 38 38








B.  Level of capital controls – no LDCs  
 
Hypothesis
level level level level
FX overvaluation 0.161 -0.163 –
(0.276) (0.459)
Trend appreciation -0.204* -0.265* -0.188* -0.261* –
(0.105) (0.160) (0.0968) (0.144)
Interest rate differential 0.703*** 0.365** 0.703*** 0.174*** +
(0.162) (0.171) (0.159) (0.0350)
FX volatility 0.695*** 1.225*** 0.687*** 1.243*** +
(0.179) (0.282) (0.179) (0.264)
FX reserves - level -0.0358 0.113 +
(0.0499) (0.0843)
FX regime -- float -1.306*** -1.107*** -1.289*** -1.177*** –
(0.133) (0.192) (0.129) (0.183)
IT regime 0.490*** 0.463** 0.487*** 0.542*** –
(0.153) (0.205) (0.152) (0.182)
Observations 706 348 706 348
C o u n t r i e s 5 85 85 85 8
R-squared 0.246 0.189 0.470 0.417
Combined model Encompassing model
benchmark post 1999 benchmark post 1999
 
 
Notes: The table shows the parameter estimates of equation (1), using OLS. Panel A provides the 
estimates when restricting the sample to only EMEs, while Panel B gives the estimates when excluding 
developing countries (LDCs). 
 
  38Table 9:  Capital flows (Hypothesis 2)  
 
A. Level of capital controls 
 
Hypothesis
level level level level
Capital outflows 0.795*** 0.756*** -0.735*** -0.562*** +
(0.160) (0.163) (0.145) (0.120)
Capital inflows -0.261* -0.273* -0.192 -0.252** +
(0.146) (0.146) (0.123) (0.113)
Net portfolio flows 0.211*** 0.198*** 0.221*** 0.159*** +
(0.0615) (0.0617) (0.0605) (0.0482)
Change capital outflows -0.426 -0.325 -0.262 +
(0.272) (0.284) (0.200)
Change capital inflows 0.161 0.0986 +
(0.184) (0.192)
Change net portfolio flows -0.185** -0.205** -0.208** -0.200*** +
(0.0871) (0.0824) (0.0814) (0.0714)
Capital flow volatility 0.142 0.119 0.144 +
(0.0941) (0.0988) (0.0932)
Observations 743 463 743 463
C o u n t r i e s 7 97 97 97 9








B. Changes in capital controls 
 
reduce raise reduce raise reduce raise reduce raise reduce raise
Capital outflows 0.535 -0.524 0.527 -0.447 – +
(0.458) (0.539) (0.527) (0.605)
Capital inflows -0.452 -0.798* -0.456 -0.849 -0.623** -1.145*** – +
(0.382) (0.448) (0.424) (0.517) (0.274) (0.441)
Net portfolio flows -0.182 -0.368 -0.307 -0.839 -0.219 -1.202*** – +
(0.211) (0.282) (0.254) (0.516) (0.159) (0.408)
Change capital outflows -0.0676 1.694 0.0974 0.734 – +
(0.775) (1.104) (0.872) (1.301)
Change capital inflows 0.447 -0.387 0.283 -0.0635 – +
(0.428) (0.751) (0.462) (0.766)
Change net portfolio flows 0.0933 -0.368* 0.117 -0.299 -0.479*** – +
(0.122) (0.219) (0.125) (0.242) (0.158)
Capital flow volatility 0.162 -2.194*** 0.0742 -2.675*** 0.201 -1.700*** -2.447*** – +
(0.157) (0.697) (0.162) (1.012) (0.125) (0.626) (0.819)
Observations 743 739 463 463 743 739 463 463







Notes: The table shows the parameter estimates of equation (1), using OLS, in panel A and of equation 
(2), using a logit model, in panel B. The columns “Hypothesis” provide the priors for the signs of the 
respective coefficients. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, 90% levels, respectively. 
 
 
  39Table 10:  Financial stability (Hypothesis 3)  
 
A. Level of capital controls 
 
Hypothesis
level level level level
Financial depth -0.308** -0.361*** -0.261** -0.367*** –
(0.130) (0.133) (0.125) (0.132)
Financial Stress Index -0.0844 -0.159* -0.156* +  /  ?
(0.0678) (0.0844) (0.0838)
Stock market capitalisation -0.502*** -0.578*** -0.443*** -0.579*** –
(0.146) (0.152) (0.138) (0.152)
Equity market returns 0.00644 0.0589 –
(0.0807) (0.112)
Equity return volatility 1.828*** 1.743*** 1.794*** 1.809*** +
(0.174) (0.254) (0.138) (0.204)
Credit growth 28.69*** 30.96*** 22.16*** 31.01*** +  /  ?
(4.199) (5.041) (1.906) (5.048)
Equity valuation -0.182* -0.261** -0.171* -0.256** –
(0.0978) (0.114) (0.0945) (0.116)
Observations 511 344 511 344
Countries 79 79 79 79








B. Changes in capital controls 
 
reduce raise reduce raise reduce raise reduce raise reduce raise
Financial depth 0.921 0.137 0.585 -0.0396 1.348*** 0.854 – +
(0.816) (0.424) (0.984) (0.759) (0.494) (0.535)
Financial Stress Index 0.00156 -0.633* 0.112 -1.483** -0.424* -1.211*** –   /   ? +  /  ?
(0.249) (0.324) (0.392) (0.597) (0.250) (0.432)
Stock market capitalisation -0.231 0.253 -0.349 -0.985** -0.502** + –
(0.557) (0.379) (0.590) (0.440) (0.243)
Equity market returns -0.0747 -0.354 -0.489 -0.833* -0.684* + –
(0.259) (0.334) (0.368) (0.501) (0.401)
Equity return volatility 1.140* -0.225 2.458** 1.216 1.031* 1.776** 1.091 – +
(0.657) (0.624) (1.064) (0.834) (0.537) (0.849) (0.779)
Credit growth 31.95 57.11*** 54.89** 85.11*** 39.12*** 37.58*** 40.99*** 50.58*** –   /   ? +  /  ?
(20.45) (11.80) (26.02) (23.18) (4.130) (3.410) (5.241) (9.574)
Equity valuation 0.155 0.585 -0.0510 0.164 0.613** + –
(0.352) (0.447) (0.397) (0.525) (0.258)
Observations 511 511 344 344 511 511 344 344








Notes: The table shows the parameter estimates of equation (1), using OLS, in panel A and of equation 
(2), using a logit model, in panel B. The columns “Hypothesis” provide the priors for the signs of the 
respective coefficients. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, 90% levels, respectively. 
 
 
  40Table 11:  Real economy and external stability (Hypothesis 4)  
 
A. Level of capital controls 
 
Hypothesis
level level level level
GDP growth 0.724*** 1.002*** 0.735*** 1.020*** –
(0.183) (0.206) (0.167) (0.198)
GDP growth volatility 0.256** 0.166 0.210* +
(0.120) (0.151) (0.111)
Inflation rate 13.01** 36.84*** 22.85*** 41.99*** +
(5.262) (9.156) (1.682) (8.109)
Current account / GDP -0.299*** -0.163 -0.304*** -0.165 –
(0.111) (0.109) (0.110) (0.109)
Trade openness -0.294*** -0.329*** -0.285*** -0.314*** –   /   ?
(0.0904) (0.0936) (0.0873) (0.0931)
Public Debt / GDP -0.0368 0.0218 +
(0.103) (0.111)
External debt / GDP -0.0974 -0.0515 -0.0913 +
(0.0703) (0.0716) (0.0640)
Observations 352 273 352 273
Countries 79 79 79 79








B. Changes in capital controls 
 
reduce raise reduce raise reduce raise reduce raise reduce raise
GDP growth -2.172*** 1.515*** -2.039*** 0.895 -2.114*** 1.256** -1.987*** + –
(0.664) (0.563) (0.690) (0.601) (0.642) (0.576) (0.592)
GDP growth volatility -0.559 0.426 -0.312 0.523 -0.512 0.511* 0.661** – +
(0.386) (0.309) (0.340) (0.426) (0.365) (0.285) (0.322)
Inflation rate 22.84 43.75*** 65.40* 57.72 18.93 57.06*** 60.79*** 50.58*** – +
(14.08) (12.90) (35.77) (47.08) (12.69) (7.723) (9.091) (7.762)
Current account / GDP -0.130 -0.130 0.289 0.123 + –
(0.765) (0.609) (0.791) (0.663)
Trade openness 1.238*** -0.0497 1.156** 0.427 1.201*** 1.024** +   /   ? –   /   ?
(0.458) (0.571) (0.555) (0.717) (0.392) (0.409)
Public Debt / GDP 0.614** -0.655 0.399 -0.258 0.572** – +
(0.270) (0.484) (0.433) (0.564) (0.270)
External debt / GDP -1.578** 0.110 -2.467*** 0.121 -1.706** -2.217*** – +
(0.774) (0.215) (0.875) (0.199) (0.727) (0.841)
Observations 352 352 273 273 352 352 273 273








Notes: The table shows the parameter estimates of equation (1), using OLS, in panel A and of equation 
(2), using a logit model, in panel B. The columns “Hypothesis” provide the priors for the signs of the 
respective coefficients. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, 90% levels, respectively. 
  41Table 12:  Combining all four hypotheses, plus capital control spillovers 
 
 
benchmark post 1999 Hypothesis
reduce raise reduce raise reduce raise
FX overvaluation -0.1786** -0.3949* – 0.6790* -0.6615** 0.5123 -1.8916** + –
(0.087) (0.229) (0.411) (0.362) (0.915) (0.942)
FX regime -- float -0.4470*** -0.3456** – 0.6876* -0.5668 1.2647*** 0.8147 + –
(0.112) (0.150) (0.357) (0.436) (0.439) (0.817)
Credit growth 4.1435** 10.7229*** + 0.2111 16.1114** 12.5636 24.1313* – +
(1.879) (2.114) (9.455) (7.419) (9.264) (13.758)
Inflation rate 11.6542*** 14.2840*** + 4.8129 12.0152*** 9.2813 37.1220** – +
(2.652) (4.509) (2.879) (4.044) (11.423) (14.850)
Financial depth -0.1200** 0.0026 – -0.6074** 0.2094 -0.3429 0.0898 + –
(0.053) (0.068) (0.265) (0.165) (0.275) (0.340)
Capital controls region 0.7775*** 0.6917*** + -2.5927** 4.1658** -39.2038*** 4.4248** – +
(0.051) (0.070) (1.039) (1.816) (13.698) (1.867)
Observations 778 397 778 778 397 397
C o u n t r i e s 7 97 9 7 97 97 97 9







Notes: The table shows the parameter estimates of equation (1), using OLS, for the “level” estimations 
and of equation (2), using a logit model, for the estimation for “changes” in capital controls. The 
columns “Hypothesis” provide the priors for the signs of the respective coefficients. “Capital controls 
region” provides the average level or average change of capital controls in the region for the level and 
change estimations, respectively. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, 90% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
  42